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Abstract
Although Slovenia is a small, relatively new nation-state, it has been justifiably called 
“neocorporatist” and a “coordinated market economy,” making it unique among post-
communist societies, including ten new EU member states. The authors explore how it 
became so, and in the process shed light on the debate between varieties of capitalism 
(VoC) and power resources theories about how coordinated or neocorporatist 
economies emerge. Although several of the elements predicted by the varieties of 
capitalism perspective were present in Slovenia, others were not. The authors also 
find that a significant mobilization by organized labor at a crucial point played an 
essential role, and overall find that power resources theory has greater explanatory 
power in this case. However, in turning from explaining how the Slovenian model was 
formed to why it was so unique among postcommunist cases, they find that specific 
historical legacies were critical, particularly those from the distinct Yugoslav form of 
communism.
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Although Slovenia is a small, relatively new nation-state, it arguably has something 
considerable to tell us about the possibilities and limits of alternatives to economic 
liberalism in the twenty-first century. By most accounts Slovenia is considered to be 
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neocorporatist or, in the language of the varieties of capitalism (VoC) literature, a 
coordinated market economy, uniquely so among the many countries that have emerged 
from communism in the last two decades. But how did it emerge as such? How were 
coordination and corporatism created in Slovenia?
As some have argued, the transformation of communism into capitalism provides 
social scientists with something of a natural experiment. Whereas most countries in 
east central Europe adopted some version of neoliberalism, with varying degrees of 
success, Slovenia is a fascinating case—in part because its policies ran counter to the 
prescriptions of international financial institutions. In contrast to most—if not all—
other countries in east central Europe, Slovenia deliberately chose a gradualist approach 
to capitalist transformation, with a relatively low level of foreign direct investment, a 
slow pace of privatization, and the adoption of seemingly rigid labor relations and a 
generous welfare regime. Moreover, Slovenia did so during a period, after the collapse 
of communism, that may have represented the apogee of neoliberal ideology.
Yet Slovenia not only fares well compared to other postcommunist countries in terms 
of labor and social standards, but also in terms of economic indicators; by most mea-
sures it is the most successful of the postcommunist economies. Its standard of living 
and wages are the highest of the new member states, and already approach the levels 
of some older EU members. Certainly this is a model to be emulated. Yet, if this is so, 
it remains to be explained why no other countries have adopted it, or even attempted 
to go down Slovenia’s path.
We will argue here that the Slovenian case can help reveal the strengths and limits 
of VoC theory versus power resources theory as explanations for different paths of 
capitalist development. Here we will focus in particular on two criticisms of the VoC 
framework: whether VoC theory can account adequately for the emergence of distinct 
types of capitalism, and whether the relative power of social actors, especially labor, 
better explains outcomes than does the interests of firms and employers.1
More specifically, we will argue that we do find evidence to support the VoC account 
of the emergence of coordinated institutions in Slovenia: out of all postcommunist 
societies, Slovenia alone came out of communism with a dominant portion of its export 
sector dependent on skilled labor, where employers had a strong interest in coordinated 
institutions. This is a pretty strong correlation. Yet we also find that the logic of emp-
loyers’ interests provides only a partial explanation—a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition. At least as important, we argue, was a well-timed strike wave, which erupted 
when the basic institutions of the Slovenian political economy were being shaped. 
Without this wave of labor mobilization, and the continued relative strength of unions 
in Slovenia, coordinated institutions would either not have emerged, or at the very 
least would have been considerably weaker and less established than they have been, 
lending strong support to the power resources theory. However, this leads us to a fur-
ther question: why did Slovenia, uniquely out of ten postcommunist EU members, have 
a labor movement sufficiently strong to create coordinated labor institutions? Here we 
agree with Iversen and colleagues on the importance of specific historical legacies and 
pathways in the formation of distinct political economies;2 however, we find only partial 
270  Politics & Society 39(2)
support for the factors they emphasize, and instead find very different and more recent 
historical factors at work in this case.3 For Slovenia, the crucial factor is the specific 
legacy of Yugoslav self-managed socialism, which differed substantially from the com-
munist legacy in countries such as Poland. Thus, central elements of both VoC and 
power resources theories were necessary to make Slovenia a coordinated economy, 
but also crucial was the legacy of Yugoslav (as opposed to Soviet-dominated) social-
ism. Taken together, while the Slovenian case shows that alternative paths of develop-
ment exist, it also demonstrates that its coordinated postcommunism was a highly 
contingent outcome.
This article will proceed in four parts: first, a theoretical discussion of VoC and 
power resources theories of the development of distinct forms of capitalism; second, 
an examination of just how exceptional Slovenia is; third, an evaluation of the validity 
of different explanatory approaches; and finally, an exploration of the theoretical imp-
lications of empirical findings.
Varieties of Capitalism and  
Power Resources Theories
Are there alternatives to liberalization given increasingly global economic competition? 
Although ample reasons exist to be pessimistic about the viability of social democracy 
and corporatism in the twenty-first century, the now extensive literature on the variet-
ies of capitalism argues that alternatives exist and will likely persist. The VoC theo-
retical perspective makes two central claims: first, that even in a globalized era, there 
are groups of national production regimes with distinctive institutional configurations—
or in short, distinct varieties of capitalism—and second, these varieties of capitalism are 
largely resistant to pressures toward convergence.4
These claims have generated considerable discussion, and it is beyond the scope 
of this article to fully recount what has become the largest debate in the field of com-
parative political economy. However, for present purposes we can confine ourselves 
to the now somewhat conventional VoC classification of Hall and Soskice, namely 
the two ideal types of liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs), since it is generally accepted that Slovenia appears to be quite 
close to the coordinated type; the concern here is how to explain how that coordination 
came about.5
For the purposes of this article, we will focus on the three of the five spheres in Hall 
and Soskice’s classification that have a direct impact on labor: bargaining mechanisms 
for wages and work conditions, vocational training, and employee relations generally.6 
Within these three spheres, in LMEs one finds flexible or decentralized labor markets 
with low levels of union density, enterprise-level bargaining with limited extension to 
other workers, and little or poorly functioning mechanisms of social dialogue with lim-
ited employers’ coordination across firms. Education tends to focus on general skills 
to complement fluid labor markets, and there is a high degree of managerial prerogative 
with little to no codetermination in the workplace. Conversely, in CMEs, one typically 
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finds high levels of union membership, highly articulated mechanisms of social dia-
logue with well-organized employers, resulting in collective agreements with a high 
rate of coverage at the national or sectoral level. These elements are combined with 
education and training systems that provide high industry-specific or firm-specific skills, 
and worker participation or codetermination at the workplace.7
Yet how are these different varieties created? According to VoC theory,
The more employers are coordinated within strong organizations, and the more 
trade unions are articulated—both horizontally across sectors and vertically 
between levels of representation—the more likely it is that cross-class coalitions 
will develop long-term horizons and invest in specific and cospecific assets. It 
then becomes possible to produce collective goods (e.g., wage moderation, skills, 
and training provision) and the complementarities that bind them together.8
Such efficient bargains, reached in crucial sectors, will then spread throughout the eco-
nomy to become its comparative institutional advantage.9 This logic is closely related 
to arguments about the development of the welfare state, which, contrary to earlier 
approaches, emphasize the needs of employers above all in accounting for the specific 
ways social services are provided in different countries.10 These two literatures have 
been recently brought together by Iversen, who argues that workers won’t invest in 
firm-specific skills unless their income is protected from the risk of losing their jobs; 
hence, employers and employees in such strategic firms and sectors will seek social 
insurance to make an investment in skills less risky.11
Is such emphasis on employers’ interests justified? As one critical review of the lit-
erature put it, according to the VoC perspective, “the emergence of labor-inclusive polit-
ical economies does not require worker mobilization let alone class struggle, since 
generous welfare states are (co)built by, and partly for, employers.”12 In arguing that 
capital rather than labor has been central to the creation and continued viability of 
distinct welfare states and production regimes, these new perspectives challenge the 
emphasis in earlier accounts, commonly known as power resources theory, that emp-
hasize the importance of working-class organization and mobilization in explaining 
distinct paths of welfare state development.13 Moreover, the predecessor to the VoC 
perspective for explaining differences between capitalisms was neocorporatist theory, 
where corporatist societies, in contrast to pluralist (or liberal) systems, were character-
ized above all by encompassing labor organizations. Although, as in the VoC perspec-
tive, corporatism is based on class compromise, such institutions were not created by 
firms seeking efficient solutions for collective action problems; instead, they were 
built as means to contain the overt class conflict of an earlier period.14 While labor 
peace coincided with strong corporatist systems in the postwar era, many argue that 
corporatist institutions evolved historically as a response to high levels of labor unrest 
in Scandinavia and elsewhere.15 Thus we have two alternative explanations for the 
emergence of distinct types of capitalism: the efficiency needs of firms and employers 
related to skills, and the degree of working-class mobilization at crucial periods.
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Recently Iversen and others have set out to create a synthesis between the power 
resources and the VoC approaches to explaining the development of specific capitalist 
varieties, particular types of welfare states, and different electoral systems.16 They do 
so by investigating the historical foundations and developmental pathways of these 
different regimes to provide a historical analysis of how coordinated institutions and 
resulting equilibria emerge. Iversen and his colleagues argue that countries that, by 1900, 
had strong guild traditions, employer coordination, widespread rural cooperatives, a 
large skill-based export sector, and centralized and industrial unions (as opposed to 
fragmented and craft unions) all developed proportional representation election systems, 
which they believe are essential to the coordinated model of capitalism and redistribu-
tionist welfare states. As we shall see, Slovenia shared a number of these characteristics, 
yet others were weak or missing. Moreover, these elements were as strong or stronger 
in some other east central European countries, though they failed to develop coordinated 
institutions.
Arguably, a close examination of the evolution of coordinated institutions is essen-
tial to resolving such questions. Slovenia provides a unique example of a contemporary, 
and rather rapid, development of a coordinated market. Others have looked at Slovenia 
for precisely this reason.17 Indeed, while the VoC framework was originally developed 
for advanced capitalist societies, a number of recent studies have applied the frame-
work to the postcommunist region, some more critically than others.18 Some studies 
have concluded that Slovenia fits the ideal type of a CME rather closely (while con-
trasting it with Estonia as a prototypical LME).19 Is Slovenia truly a coordinated mar-
ket and neocorporatist society? If so, how did it become one?
Slovenia’s Postcommunist Neocorporatism
One might be tempted to dismiss Slovenia as a relatively small country with little addi-
tional significance. Yet the differences between it and the other postcommunist countries 
are striking. Regarding unions, Slovenia’s level of union density was about 40 percent 
through the 1990s, and although it has recently dropped below 30 percent, it is still 
significantly higher than that of other postcommunist EU members where the average 
density is 18.6 percent. Slovenia’s union density approaches the average density of the 
preaccession EU member states (EU-15), which is 36.8 percent.20 Collective bargain-
ing coverage—and the level on which those agreements are reached—is even more 
central than union density to the distinction between coordinated and liberal capital-
isms. Here Slovenia is more exceptional still in terms of its coverage rate for collective 
agreements, which is said to be close to 100 percent, due to its extension rules. The 
comparable coverage rate for other postcommunist new member states is 27.4 percent, 
whereas the average coverage rate for the EU-15 is 78.8 percent.21
The level on which collective bargaining takes place is essential to the quality of 
collective bargaining, as well as to the definitions of CMEs and neocorporatism. In 
Slovenia, collective bargaining takes place predominantly at the sectoral level, framed 
by income policy agreements; almost all bargaining elsewhere in Eastern Europe takes 
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place at the company level.22 According to Visser’s centralization of wage bargaining 
index, which measures the degree of centralization in bargaining on a scale from 1 
(fully centralized) to 0 (no centralization), Slovenia’s degree of bargaining centra-
lization is .43, close to the EU-15 average of .46, whereas the other new member states 
average .26.23
The VoC literature argues that employer organizations are central to the creation 
and continued viability of coordinated market economies. Yet, in postcommunist soci-
eties the lack of strong employer organizations has been, in the words of one study, 
“the most significant weakness in industrial relations since the beginning of the transi-
tion.”24 Once again, Slovenia stands out. Until recently, the coverage rate of employer 
organization in Slovenia approached 100 percent, due to compulsory membership in 
the Chamber of Commerce. Since the law on compulsory membership was rescinded, 
Slovenia’s rate of employer organization is said to be 40 percent; along with Hungary 
its rate is the highest of the new member states, though lower than the EU-15 average 
of 66.6 percent. In other postcommunist member states the employer organization rate 
averages 27.4 percent.25
The VoC literature argues that employers’ organizations are central to coordinated 
economies because of the need to prevent the poaching by other firms of workers who 
have acquired industry-specific skills. With the collapse of communism, vocational 
education has largely deteriorated in east central Europe, and these societies have gen-
erally moved toward more general skills training as in the liberal model.26 Slovenia is 
exceptional in that it has a “dual system of apprenticeships, very much like the German 
system.”27 Even more important has been the development of company-specific skills, 
which is typical in the large and most advanced Slovenian firms. This is consistent 
with VoC theory arguments about the generation of cospecific assets in CMEs.
Workplace participation is another characteristic of the coordinated model, according 
to VoC theory. Slovenia is also unique in the postcommunist world for adopting works 
councils that approach German-style codetermination.28 In Slovenia, as in Germany, 
unions see works councils as an additional avenue for worker input, whereas elsewhere 
in the region trade unions have viewed works councils as a means for employers to 
undermine unions.29
Beyond centralized collective bargaining, Slovenia remains universally recognized 
as the one country in the region with a fully functioning system of social dialogue, des-
erving of the label “neocorporatist.”30 Additional evidence that Slovenia is unique 
reg arding social dialogue comes from the country’s experience with social pacts. In 
order to meet the exacting macroeconomic Eurozone criteria, a number of countries in 
Western Europe reached social pacts between unions and employers, compromising 
on difficult issues such as wage moderation and government budget cuts.31 Despite the 
fact that preparations for joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) pose significant 
challenges for new member states—especially in terms of labor and welfare policies—
such pacts have been all but absent in east central Europe.32 The striking counterex-
ample is once again Slovenia, which produced a series of income policy agreements 
and social pacts beginning in the mid-1990s that focused on the incremental adoption 
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of the Eurozone criteria.33 Slovenia subsequently joined the Eurozone in 2007, the first 
postcommunist member to do so.
Social dialogue mechanisms, when functioning, can directly influence the size and 
shape of welfare states, and the VoC perspective argues that a coordinated economy 
should have a more universal and egalitarian welfare state.34 Slovenia spends 23 percent 
of its gross domestic product on social expenditures, below the EU-15 average of 26.8 
percent, but well above the other eastern central European average of 16.4 percent.35 
Still, a number of commentators have argued that welfare states in the Visegrád states 
(the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) are relatively robust, and the 
differences in welfare states between these four countries and Slovenia are not as great 
as they are regarding labor policies.36 However, a number of new member states have 
liberalized their welfare states, whereas Slovenia has largely refrained from doing so. 
For example, virtually all Eastern European states have adopted some type of “new 
pension reforms,” which entail the full or partial replacement of public social security 
systems with systems based on private, individual pension savings accounts.37 Such a 
policy was proposed for Slovenia, but was rejected, in no small part due to union mobi-
lization against it.38
Table 1 summarizes a number of the statistical measures discussed in this section. 
As the table indicates, Slovenia is the highest among east central European countries 
in almost every category, and in most categories it approaches or surpasses the EU-15 
average.
Table 1. Industrial Relations in East Central Europe (ECE)





Union density 22 14 17 16 14 17 30 >30 18.6 36.8
Collective bargaining 
coverage
35 22 42 20 15 35 50 100 27.4 78.8
Collective bargaining 
centralization
.27 .25 .26 .30 .23 .20 .33 .43 .26 .46
Employers’ density 32 25 40 25 20 20 30 40 27.4 66.6
Workplace 
representation
44 25 36 27 23 22 50 64 32.4 59.6
Social pacts — — — — — — — Yes None Several
Social expenditure 18.7 12.4 22.3 12.4 13.1 19.2 16.7 23 16.4 26.8
Pension reform No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 8 of 9 2 of 15
Sources: rows 1–2, 4–5: Euround European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line, http://www.eurofound.europa.
eu/eiro/country_index.htm; row 3: Jelle Visser, “Patterns and Variations in European Industrial Relations,” in Industrial 
Relations in Europe 2004 (Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Communities); row 7: 
Eurostat, Total expenditure on social protection, current prices (% of GDP), 2006 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/; row 8: Mitchell A. Orenstein, Privatizing Pensions: The Transnational Campaign for Social 
Security Reform (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). CZ - Czech Repubic; EE - Estonia; HU - Hungary; LV - 
Latvia; LT - Lithuania; PL - Poland; SK - Slovakia; SL - Slovenia; EU -15 - EU members before 2004 expansion
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Explaining Slovenia’s Neocorporatism
There is little question that Slovenia is truly exceptional among the many countries 
emerging from communism, including those countries that are now EU member states. 
The very existence of Slovenia as a CME lends credence to the claim of VoC theory 
that coordinated economies remain viable.
But why is Slovenia so different from other postcommunist states? Others have 
argued that the emergence of coordination in Slovenia is best explained through VoC 
theory.39 We will argue that the picture is more complex.
Certainly a number of factors have led to Slovenia’s relative success. Slovenia was 
a republic within Yugoslavia, and this had several consequences. Yugoslavia was the 
most market-oriented of countries within communist Eastern Europe, and since it was 
outside the Soviet bloc, it had extensive trade relations with the capitalist world. 
Slovenia was also the most “western” of the Yugoslav republics, in terms of geography, 
market orientation, trade profile, and standard of living.40 Also in significant contrast 
to other Yugoslav republics, Slovenia was the most ethnically homogenous, and as the 
first republic to secede from the Yugoslav federation, it was able to achieve indepen-
dence in days, with a minimal amount of bloodshed.41
Thus upon independence, Slovenia was a largely market-oriented economy already, 
with a higher standard of living than any other former communist country. Moreover, 
the initial recession was not as severe as elsewhere and “throughout the transition period 
Slovenia sustained favorable positions in its fiscal and external accounts.”42 As such, 
it was less susceptible to pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
partly as a result, the nation was able to pursue a gradualist approach to economic trans-
formation.43 Accordingly, it has relied on much lower levels of foreign direct invest-
ment than most other countries in east central Europe, most of whom made the attraction 
of foreign capital a cornerstone of their policies.
Although much of this helps explain why Slovenia has been relatively successful, 
how do we explain the rapid development of coordinated institutions in particular? 
Feldmann, following Hall and Soskice, proposes a “theory of emerging VoC coordina-
tion,” which emphasizes the role of networks or ties among actors that can help solve 
collective action problems. In the Slovenian case, he points to two important policy 
choices that helped transform proto-networks into institutions that promoted coopera-
tion. First, many different forms of privatization were debated, but the ruling party of 
the time had “close ties to the old economic elites, including enterprise directors.” 
Largely for this reason, the government chose a privatization strategy that privileged 
insiders, “which essentially cemented the preexisting networks by strengthening the 
role of insiders as owners.”44 The second policy innovation was centralized collective 
bargaining, which Feldmann argues came about in part because membership in 
the employers’ organization, the Chamber of Commerce, was mandatory. Yet this 
is insufficient to explain why employers would choose centralized bargaining. In addi-
tion, Feldmann argues that Slovenia chose a managed float for its currency, which led 
to wage increases:
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Real wage increases became unsustainable in the early 1990s, and this was a 
source of major concern to employers (especially exporters) and the government. 
The establishment of [tripartism] in 1994 followed a year of very high wage 
increases—11.6 percent in 1993—and the centralization of wage bargaining 
was seen as a key step to combat this problem.45
Even though inflationary wage pressures certainly spurred employers to support cen-
tralized wage bargaining, the managed float was not the primary source of that wage 
pressure, as we shall see.
Perhaps more important for the VoC perspective was that the Slovenian economy 
centered around a core group of large capital-intensive and western-oriented companies 
from the metal and machine industry (such as Gorenje) and chemical/pharmaceutical 
industries (such as Krka), where workers cooperated with managers in a form of 
Streeck’s “competitive solidarity.”46 In these companies, employers supported the job 
security of core workers in order to motivate them to develop company-specific skills. 
In this way, managers and workers in these sectors developed cross-class coalitions, and 
the coalitions within these dominant firms had a strong influence on the laws that became 
the core of the Slovenian coordinated model.47 Adding all of this up, the Slovenian case 
appears to confirm much of the institutional logic of coordinated economies.
However, important elements are missing from this account. For one, the western-
oriented companies in Slovenia represented a departure from coordinated firms else-
where in that the protected Yugoslav market effectively subsidized them during the 
communist period. As Jaklič et al. explain,
The peculiarity concerning the functioning of these companies was the lack of 
hard budget constraints, a feature that was all-encompassing and the result of lax 
monetary policy used as the ultimate risk-sharing tool since it prevented com-
panies from going bankrupt. As a consequence, the Yugoslav dinar was not con-
vertible and the country was chronically in need of foreign exchange. Companies 
were therefore stimulated to export and generate hard currency inflows even if 
that meant selling abroad at loss. That eventual loss could be compensated for 
by selling at profit in the well-protected home market.48
Thus with Slovenian independence, the hardening of budget constraints combined with 
the loss of the protected Yugoslav markets meant these firms faced a rather unique crisis 
of competitiveness.
Moreover, in addition to this dominant capital-intensive part of the export sector, a 
massive number of labor-intensive companies from the textile, footwear, and wood indus-
tries had been almost exclusively focused on the vanishing Yugoslav market. This part 
of industry, which based its price competition on cheap, unskilled labor, was an impor-
tant source of trade union membership (where, in addition to high density rates overall, 
industrial workers made up about 70 percent of union membership through the mid-
1990s) and mobilization power. The left-center government that ruled with considerable 
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stability for twelve years was very much influenced by the interplay of these capital- 
and labor-intensive sectors, and government policies—such as privatization and mon-
etary policy—were aimed at the common denominator that would benefit both groups.
Thus, in contrast to a primary focus on the interest of employers for efficiency gains 
as in the VoC account, we develop an alternative approach that emphasizes two sets of 
factors: the extent to which labor and class conflict (rather than employers and coop-
eration) helped shape institutional outcomes, and the historical conditions that might 
enable labor to mobilize sufficiently to do so. In the case of Slovenia, a more historical 
approach would emphasize that the Yugoslav experience with communism was quite 
different from that of other states in the region. Unlike other Eastern European coun-
tries (except for Albania), communist rule came about in Yugoslavia through an indig-
enous revolution, rather than being imposed by Soviet tanks. This basic fact—whether 
communism was viewed as homegrown or alien—has had an enormous impact on 
how communist-era institutions were viewed in the postcommunist era.
Moreover, Yugoslav communism was forced to develop outside of the Soviet bloc, 
and as a result, sought to legitimize its independence through the ideology and institu-
tions of “self-management,” which had significant consequences for labor in particular. 
Most concretely for our purposes, unlike other communist states, the Yugoslav regime 
tolerated strikes and sought to dampen them by quickly meeting workers’ demands, a 
policy that often had the unintended effect of encouraging others to strike.49 Like unions 
in other communist countries, Yugoslav unions were set up as “transmission belts” of 
Communist Party rule, but the pressure from strikes—as well as competition from 
legally protected workers councils operating as parallel structures to unions—gradually 
pushed unions to become more responsive to worker demands.
By the late 1980s, as the country underwent economic crisis and hyperinflation, 
Yugoslavia was faced with a massive strike wave.50 As Slovenia achieved indepen-
dence in June 1991, the strike wave continued, and in effect “connected the country’s 
‘communist’ and ‘postcommunist’ periods.”51 Indeed, the relationship between the 
newly emerging Slovenian state and trade unions “started in a confrontational manner.”52 
Upon independence, and in a fragile social and economic context marked by high infla-
tion (approaching 200 percent per year), the government froze wages and suspended 
collective agreements and unilaterally issued a draft agreement on social stability. 
This action infuriated Slovenia’s unions; in response, on March 18, 1992, the main 
union federation Zveza svobodnih sindikatov Slovenije (ZSSS) organized a massive 
warning strike that involved work stoppages, blockades, and a power cut that para-
lyzed the country for a few hours.53
The warning strike triggered the strike wave in 1992, when, despite the country’s 
small size, there were approximately 200 strikes in that year alone.54 The strike wave 
took on “the characteristics of a spontaneous mass workers’ movement,” meaning that 
“Slovenia was faced with the possibility of an explosion of social unrest.”55 Strikes 
began to taper off in the years after, and by the end of 1990s, strikes in Slovenia were 
rare. We need to use caution in interpreting Slovenian strike data, since they come from 
the main trade union federation.56 However, according to these figures, during the crucial 
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years of 1992 to 2000, Slovenia was the most strike-prone country in east central Europe: 
the volume of strikes (or working days lost per 1,000 employees) in those years was 
ninety-two in Slovenia, compared to twenty-one elsewhere in Eastern Europe. This is 
rather surprising when one considers that Slovenia has the strongest corporatist institu-
tions in the region, and is often characterized as a society with considerable labor peace, 
though this characterization fits only from the mid-1990s onward.
According to power resources theory, the explanation for the establishment of strong 
corporatist institutions has been the mobilization power of workers. Despite the dra-
matic transformations in the region, strike rates have been significantly lower on aver-
age in Eastern Europe (excluding Slovenia) than in Western Europe from the 1990s to 
the present (see Figure 1).57
However, when we disaggregate the data we find significant strike activity in four 
countries in the region (see Figure 2).58 We need to be cautious in making compari-
sons, given differences in counting rules. The Polish strike rates, for instance, seem 
particularly undercounted.59 But based on the available data, the Slovenian strike wave 
stands out for its multiyear intensity, for its cross-sectoral composition (matched only 
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Figure 1. Changes in strike volume by region and year
Sources: Laborsta Internet, http://laborsta.ilo.org/; Miroslav Stanojević, “Formation of the Slovenian 
Pattern: The Strike Wave and Industrial Relations ‘Rigidities,’” South-East Europe Review 6, no. 3 (2003): 
17–30.
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What were the consequences of the Slovenian strike wave, and what might explain 
why strikes began to decline after 1992? The immediate impact of the “warning strike” 
of March 1992 was that wages were unfrozen, and a month later the center-right Demos 
government led by Christian Democrat Prime Minister Alojz Peterle resigned and a 
caretaker government was formed.60 The interim prime minister was Janez Drnovšek, 
president of the center-left Liberal Democrats of Slovenia (LDS) party. The interim 
government adopted a law on privatization (the Law on Ownership) and at the end the 
year, Drnovšek’s LDS party won reelection to lead a revised coalition, and from there 
led a succession of center-left coalition governments for the next twelve years.61
Most importantly, the basic institutions of Slovenia’s postcommunist political eco-
nomy were forged during—and often in direct response to—this period of intense labor 
conflict. Significantly, the strikes were often led not by workers in the leading, western-
oriented and highly skilled sector emphasized by VoC theory, but more often by work-
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Figure 2. Strike rates (per thousand workers), Western and Eastern Europe, 1993–2005 
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then-vanishing Yugoslav market.62 Moreover, the immediate demands were often defen-
sive in nature, protesting low wages or their late payment. Yet crucially, the strike wave 
coincided with debates over the form of privatization for the Slovenian economy. As 
Feldmann notes, a number of different proposals regarding privatization were on the table 
at this time.63 However, despite Feldmann’s claim, the former communists, the party 
with the closest ties to enterprise directors, were not the ruling party when the Law on 
Ownership was passed in 1992; the LDS was. On the other hand, the Law on Ownership 
coincided rather closely with the dissatisfaction expressed by striking workers in the 
labor-intensive industries that had fully depended on the Yugoslav market. Given 
these pressures, as well as the Yugoslav legacy of social ownership (or self-management), 
all participants in the debate over the new law on privatization implicitly agreed that 
workers should get some shares. The major trade union ZSSS organized a special 
conference in October of 1992, where it formulated demands for workers to be given 
the majority of shares and then delivered those demands to Parliament.64 The version 
of the law finally adopted was a compromise, but one that strongly favored internal 
buyouts that benefited all the key players: the state, managers, and workers.65 Workers 
did get majority shares in many firms, but primarily in the labor-intensive (and strike-
prone) sectors.66 After this initial protopolitical exchange, strikes in these industries 
quieted down; this exchange signaled that unions were a force to be reckoned with, but 
also that they could be included in the policy-making process as responsible, corporatist, 
social partners.67
Through this initial step labor’s voice first became institutionalized.68 As has been 
argued elsewhere,
The discontent expressed through the strikes was extremely intense, so the price 
of its lowering was high. The Slovenian political elite, under the pressure of mas-
sive social discontent, had to promote striking workers into being (co-)owners 
of the factories. This was the direct price for “calming down” the tensions.69
Although the privatization law helped dampen strike activity, it did not solve the prob-
lem of wage inflation and the challenge of competitiveness, which continued at high 
levels even after the election of Drnovšek’s revised center-left coalition. From the view-
point of employers, including those in western-oriented firms, there were initially a 
number of levers that might be used to reduce wage demands and boost competiveness. 
The simplest was to let the hardening of budget constraints and the resulting unemploy-
ment lower the market bargaining power of employees. Indeed, unemployment, which 
had been quite low in Slovenia through much of the communist period, began to rise 
significantly.70 However, due to mass strikes, employers soon abandoned this option 
in order to end the strike wave, and backed the government’s introduction of early 
retirement schemes and generous compensation for lost jobs as means to stabilize the 
labor force. A second option was the wage freeze, proposed by the center-right Demos 
coalition that had the support of a number of employers. But the March 1992 general 
strike, called in response to the government’s unilateral wage freeze, sent a strong signal 
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to all future governments that the issue of inflation could not be resolved without the 
prior approval of the trade unions. If, given union opposition, a simple wage freeze 
was out of the question, so was a monetarist solution, which would have entailed high 
levels of unemployment, likely also triggering union opposition. Thus, even before the 
center-right government was removed from power, the general strike “and several other 
strikes convinced the government to abandon the wage freeze and to accept union 
proposals to manage inflation via centralized collective bargaining.”71 Hence the gov-
ernment, together with unions and employers, pursued a policy of negotiated wage 
constraint, with the first social pact in 1994 not only setting the parameters for incomes 
policy for that year, but also establishing the Economic and Social Council, which 
institutionalized the process of social dialogue. This was a straightforward political 
trade-off: in exchange for supporting wage restraint, unions were given an institutional 
forum that enabled their systematic participation in future policy formation.72 This 
council of social dialogue subsequently allowed for the consensual formation of income 
and other policies and stabilized Slovenia’s centralized collective bargaining system; 
in fact, by lowering inflation, it stabilized the entire economy in addition to supporting 
its relatively generous welfare regime. As VoC theory would contend, employers also 
backed centralized collective bargaining, which offered a competitive price policy for 
their firms (as did the government, since it provided the potential for national competi-
tiveness and stabilization for future European integration). However, in the Slovenian 
case, employers’ support clearly came in the context of wage inflation and a large strike 
wave, where such external bargaining served to push the conflict-ridden issue of pay 
outside of the firm. Thus, as Korpi has argued was the case elsewhere, employers did come 
to embrace centralized bargaining, but only as a second (or third) best option, when 
other avenues were closed.73
What occurred was chain of social conflicts, followed by political exchanges, and 
finally the institutionalization of those exchanges. From the onset of independence and 
in a challenging economic environment, a strike wave arose, marked by the impressive 
general warning strike, which prevented the freezing of wages. After the general strike 
the center-right government was replaced with an interim center-left government, which 
coordinated work on the law on privatization favoring employee ownership, which 
dampened the strike wave. After the adoption of the privatization law, LDS won the 
election, and then—still being pressed by inflation—invited unions to support a policy 
of wage restraint. Unions accepted this offer in exchange for political influence on the 
shaping of future social and economic policy. The exchange was then institutionalized 
in the spring of 1994 with the formation of the Economic and Social Council. This ins-
titutionalization of corporatist mechanisms helped the center-left remain in power in 
Slovenia for twelve years.
To be sure, a number of crucial factors helped create the coordinated model for 
Slovenia, not least its relatively favorable starting conditions, including the western-
oriented and skilled export sector whose interests, as the VoC approach would predict, 
came to dominate the political economy. Yet other factors were equally important and 
have been overlooked. In particular, labor mobilization played a substantial role in the 
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formation of Slovenia’s coordinated economy. Of the two factors that Feldmann argues 
were central to “network promotion” in the creation of Slovenia’s CME (insider priva-
tization and centralized bargaining), both were directly impacted by the strike wave 
(the latter directly through worker demands and indirectly through wage growth pres-
sure that gave employers the incentive to support coordinated wage bargaining).
Of course, strikes by themselves won’t bring about coordination. As a brief com-
parison with Poland will make clear, the timing of the strikes was also crucial, along 
with the fact that they were led by a united union movement, and that they centered 
around broadly social democratic demands.
Strikes without Coordination in Poland
Why was Slovenia the only postcommunist country with a labor movement powerful 
enough to push successfully for coordinated labor institutions? For reasons of space, 
we will focus on a comparison with Poland, which justifiably stands out in the region 
(and the world) for its historically strong labor movement, one that played a central 
role in bringing an end to communist rule in Poland. While Romania and Hungary also 
experienced high strike rates in certain years (Figure 2), those actions were largely con-
fined to certain industries.74 The comparison is imperfect: there are substantial differ-
ences in population size, starting conditions, and such factors as the relative proportion 
of the rural sector.75 Still, aside from Slovenia, Poland was the only country to experi-
ence a sustained, multiyear strike wave across industries; and like Slovenia, it did so 
relatively early in the postcommunist period.76 If any labor movement in east central 
Europe had sufficient power resources to push for the institutionalization of workers’ 
interests it was Poland.
As Ekiert and Kubik note in their study, “During the 1989–1993 period, collective 
protest in Poland was intense” and “waves of strikes swept through entire sectors of 
the economy.”77 In both Poland and Slovenia, the first years of the postcommunist 
period were met with significant labor protests. Yet the impact of the protests and the 
policy outcomes they helped shape were quite different in both cases.
Although communist legacies were essential in shaping the labor movements in 
both countries, those legacies were quite different in each case. Unlike Yugoslavia, 
where communism came about through indigenous revolution, communism in Poland 
was largely imposed by the Red Army after World War II. With the end of commu-
nism, Solidarity’s struggle against the communist-backed trade unions led to a highly 
fragmented union movement, divided primarily by the stark ideological divisions between 
the two leading union federations, Solidarity and the (once communist-backed) OPZZ. 
While a number of scholars have argued that union competition spurs labor mobiliza-
tion, partisan ties also shape union strategies, and labor mobilization in Poland was 
muted by the political alliances of the opposing unions.78 Thus the first postcommunist 
government in Poland was led by Solidarity, the party directly allied with the union 
movement, though in 1989 it began implementing the economic policy that became 
known as “shock therapy.” Paczynska argues that while Polish unions were later 
relatively influential,
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In the first years of reform both trade unions and work councils did little to block 
the restructuring of enterprises and in many cases were active promoters of these 
changes. At the national level, Solidarity trade union extended a “protective 
umbrella” over the reforms, containing strike activities and promoting enterprise 
restructuring.79
In one clear contrast with Slovenia, where the government’s proposed unilateral wage 
freeze was met with a general strike led by ZSSS, when Poland’s Solidarity govern-
ment imposed a controversial tax on wage hikes, the Solidarity union acted to tamp 
down any strike action.80 Only when the Solidarity union’s support for reforms began 
depleting its membership rolls and prompting wildcat strikes did the union begin to 
oppose economic reforms. Yet when the Solidarity government lost the election in 
1993 and was replaced by the ex-communist Alliance of the Democratic Left, allied 
with OPZZ, the Solidarity union, shaped more by anticommunism than traditional 
working-class goals, opposed even pro-labor legislation backed by the new govern-
ment.81 Thus in contrast to Slovenia, unions in Poland were not only divided, but 
Solidarity, the dominant Polish union, often refused to back social democratic goals at 
crucial periods of reform.82
Not surprisingly, these divisions and strategies had a direct impact on how labor 
power was translated into policy. First, Poland and Slovenia were both unique in hav-
ing large strike waves early in the transition period, but the exact timing was different 
in each case. Partly because the Solidarity union provided a “protective umbrella” for 
reforms, when shock therapy reforms began in 1989–90, labor protests rose significantly 
only in 1991 and reached a peak in 1992.83 Although strikes in Slovenia also peaked 
in 1992, Slovenia achieved independence in mid-1991, and the Slovenian strike wave 
was built on a wave of strikes that had begun in the Yugoslav period prior to indepen-
dence.84 Thus, Polish reformers had a two-year opening before strikes reached their 
peak (which leading reformer Leszek Balcerowicz later referred to as Poland’s “win-
dow of opportunity”),85 whereas Slovenian strikes spilled over from the communist 
period, before most major reforms had begun. In short, whereas the Polish strikes were 
reactive, strikes in Slovenia were constitutive.
Second, and partly as a result, while Polish officials made significant concessions 
to end the strike wave, the main impact of those concessions was to slow the pace of 
reform, rather than to fundamentally alter or reshape it. The wage restraint policy was 
dropped, enterprise restructuring was slowed, and unemployment levels were relatively 
constrained for a time.86 Privatization proceeded at a much slower pace in Poland than 
in neighboring countries, with some concessions to employee ownership.87 Even 
though unions had success in modifying certain policies, as Ekiert and Kubik conclude, 
“the main contours of economic policy introduced in 1990 were neither challenged or 
drastically changed.”88 In Poland, labor’s power resources, when measured by mobili-
zation capacity, appeared quite significant, but the key question was how that power 
was organized and how labor’s interests and goals were interpreted.
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Although there are limits to what we can conclude from this brief comparison, we 
argue that if Poland had a single union confederation, united around a clear goal of 
social democratic principles, pushed by a similar strike wave occurring earlier in the 
transition period (i.e., had Polish unions been more like Slovenian unions), the out-
come would have been a substantially different, and a much less “liberal,” if not coor-
dinated, economy.89 This would of course have required Polish society to be fundamentally 
different from the one that emerged from communism.
Although we have argued that the Yugoslav legacy was different, other post-Yugoslav 
countries faced nationalist wars that, in contrast to Slovenia, diverted labor’s attention 
at a crucial moment—during the founding of independent states. Still, labor protests 
in Serbia continued during wartime, and worker mobilization played a key part in the 
downfall of Slobodan Milošević.90 More recently, in Serbia and Croatia, workers have 
taken the dramatic steps of factory occupations as a means of protesting what are con-
sidered illegitimate privatizations.91 Though these protests typically take place without 
union backing, unionization rates in Serbia and Croatia are in the range of 40 percent, 
making them, along with Slovenia, the most unionized Eastern European states.92
However, in the case of Slovenia, the coordinated model has recently come under 
considerable pressure. In 2006, the center-right government, which had come to power 
in 2004 when Slovenia joined the EU, deliberately attempted to dismantle the networks 
of coordination described by Feldmann.93 The government changed the law that gover-
ned membership in the main Chamber of Commerce that represented large companies—
shifting membership from obligatory to voluntary (although it did not apply the same 
reform to the chamber that represented small companies). The employers in large, export-
oriented firms were willing to acquiesce to these changes for one crucial reason: the 
government signaled that is would soon sell its remaining shares in these firms, and 
managers were willing to sacrifice coordinated institutions in order to gain greater per-
sonal ownership of their firms. As a result, employers have become divided.
Once again, labor mobilized in response, so far successfully, to resist “employer 
demands to negotiate pay at company level only” and what some characterize as the 
“rather radical demands of employers to reduce workers’ rights.”94 Employers also 
lobbied for amendments to the Law on Labor Relations, which passed with strong sup-
port of the unions in 2002, in order to make it more flexible.95 Yet unions successfully 
mobilized against the flexibilization of labor relations, and also succeeded in defeating 
a proposed flat tax. Their pressure led to significant decline in public support for the 
government, leading to the resignation of the minister for reforms, and later the 
removal of the labor minister. Unions also succeeded in defeating a proposed flat tax. 
Such protests, as well as the willingness of key employers to abandon coordination, 
strongly suggest that coordination in Slovenia now rests more on the continued mobili-
zation capacity of labor than on a functional equilibrium based on a cross-class coali-
tion led by employers in leading firms.
However, recent developments have posed the question of whether Slovenia’s insti-
tutions of coordination and corporatism are resilient enough to survive the challenges 
of a right-of-center government (defeated in elections of 2008), the resistance of 
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emp loyers, and the pressures of Eurozone membership. While Slovenia was better 
positioned than many other postcommunist countries to weather the recent global eco-
nomic crisis, as the recent decline in union density suggests, it remains to be seen if the 
new center-left coalition will succeed in preventing further erosion of Slovenia’s insti-
tutions of coordination.
Theoretical Implications
There are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn from a single case. However, we 
argue that the Slovenian example can help evaluate the strengths and limits of VoC 
versus power resources theories in explaining the development of distinct political 
economies. Although both theoretical approaches contribute to the answer of how 
Slovenia created a coordinated economy, we find the power resources view more 
persuasive in this case. Yet when we turn to the question of why coordination emerged 
in Slovenia alone, out of ten postcommunist EU members, we turn to the importance 
of historical legacies, pathways, and critical junctures.
First, we find VoC theory to be a necessary but insufficient explanation for the rise 
of coordinated institutions in Slovenia. We argue that it is necessary based on a very 
strong correlation: out of ten postcommunist members of the EU, Slovenia alone deve-
loped coordinated institutions, and it alone emerged from communism with the economic 
profile expected by VoC theory to generate sufficient support for coordination—namely 
a dominant export-led sector of the economy that relied on skilled labor. Other studies 
have also found Slovenia to adhere closely to the coordinated model of capitalism.96 
At the very least—and this is one of the main points of the VoC argument—the exam-
ple of Slovenia suggests there is indeed an alternative to an international competitiveness 
strategy based on flexible labor markets and relatively low wages and labor standards 
as a means of attracting foreign capital, even for countries emerging from forty-five 
years of communism.
However, we also find the VoC account to be insufficient. Most especially, we find 
that labor militancy played a central role in shaping Slovenia’s coordinated institu-
tions, lending support to the argument that the power resources of social actors best 
explains the rise of corporatism and generous welfare states, and that employers seek 
compromise when confronted with class conflict.97 Slovenian employers, especially in 
the crucial export sector, were certainly concerned with retaining skilled employees, 
but the key institutions of Slovenian coordination and corporatism were created in the 
wake of a massive strike wave, one that gave employers significant incentive to coor-
dinate wage increases and forge other institutions, such as employee ownership, that 
could contain future labor mobilizations. In short, although there is much in the 
Slovenian case to support the VoC account, the evidence strongly suggests that labor 
mobilization—in both its extent and its timing—was essential to the emergence of 
coordination in Slovenia.98
In another crucial departure from VoC theory, not only did an undertheorized social 
actor, namely labor, have a central impact, so did an unexpected sector. The strike wave 
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was centered not in the skilled export sector, but in the less-skilled, labor-intensive sec-
tor, which quickly felt the pain of the transition to the (post-Yugoslav) market. Thus it was 
this constellation of interests—labor and employer, unskilled and skilled sectors—that 
had to be conciliated during the formation of the Slovenian political economy.
A single case study does not allow us to precisely weigh the importance of different 
causal factors. However, subsequent events strongly suggest the importance of the 
factors emphasized by power resources theory relative to those of VoC theory. Most 
importantly, in recent years when employers were no longer compelled by law to orga-
nize themselves, many—especially in the skilled export sector—withdrew their member-
ship in the employers’ Chamber of Commerce and began to push for the end of coordinated 
institutions such as centralized collective bargaining. Thus in Slovenia we find little 
evidence of the lock-in effects or stable equilibrium of coordinated institutions pre-
dicted by VoC theory. On the other hand, labor mobilized, and prevented some (but 
not all) of these more liberal reforms from taking place. In short, if employer interests 
were the main factor driving coordination, we would not expect significant numbers 
of employers to defect once coordination was made voluntary rather than compulsory; 
likewise, if labor’s power resources were insufficient, we would expect those coordi-
nated institutions to have eroded fairly rapidly, and Slovenia to look much more like 
other postcommunist societies.
Although we find strong support for the power resources perspective in explaining 
how Slovenia created coordination, this begs the question of why only in Slovenia 
did labor have sufficient power resources to achieve this outcome. Here we find that a 
historical institutional explanation is crucial. Interestingly, Iversen and colleagues have 
recently proposed a synthesis of power resources and VoC theories, and their explana-
tion centers on deep historical paths of development to explain the divergence of coor-
dinated and liberal market economies (and different electoral systems).99 As stated 
earlier, according to their argument, countries that by 1900 had strong guild traditions, 
employer coordination, widespread rural cooperatives, a large skill-based export sec-
tor, and centralized and industrial unions (as opposed to fragmented and craft unions) 
all developed proportional representation election systems, which they say were essen-
tial for the creation of the coordinated model of capitalism and redistributionist wel-
fare states.
Although Iversen and his collaborators rightly point to the importance of historical 
pathways, the specific historical factors they identify are of only partial utility in east 
central Europe. In the case of Slovenia, some of their historical preconditions were pres-
ent, but others were not. On the one hand, the employers’ organization, the Chamber of 
Commerce, was formed during the Habsburg Empire, and managed to survive the 
socialist period. Rural, premodern cooperative communities were an important influence 
on subsequent developments.100 On the other hand, Slovenia was not very industrial-
ized by 1900 (the period Cusack et al. posit as crucial), with an even greater portion of 
its population employed in agriculture than the average for the Austro-Hungarian 
empire, where industrialization remained relatively low and very uneven. Nor was there 
a “large skill-based export sector” at the time, since the Austro-Hungarian Empire as 
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a whole was not export-oriented.101 Slovenia did inherit important industry and craft 
traditions from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and with 20 percent of its population 
employed in industry and crafts, it was the most industrialized Yugoslav region at the 
founding of the Yugoslav kingdom. However, the bulk of Slovenian industrialization 
occurred only after World War II in the communist period.
Moreover, if the existence of crucial precursors—such as guild traditions, employer 
coordination, and specific union formations—were essential to explaining the subse-
quent development of coordinated capitalism, one would predict that the Czech Republic, 
rather than Slovenia, would stand out among the countries of east central Europe. 
Bohemia was one of the most industrialized regions in the Austro-Hungarian empire; 
its exports were world renowned, and its craft and guild traditions ran quite deep. 
Furthermore, in the interwar period, Czechoslovakia developed a successful propor-
tional representation electoral system, and the country was the only democracy in the 
region to survive until World War II. The Czech lands also had strong levels of union-
ization and a thriving Social Democratic Party.102
Yet Slovenia stands out from the Czech Republic, as well as from every other post-
communist country in east central Europe. This leads us to posit that while Iversen and 
his collaborators may have discovered some important preconditions for the subse-
quent development of coordinated institutions, the intervening history of the communist 
period is essential in explaining the different trajectories in east central Europe.103 
Although it is not entirely surprising that Soviet communism effectively crushed the 
economic interests that might have led to coordination in the Czech and Hungarian 
cases, it is surprising that Yugoslav communism in effect nurtured those interests, or 
at least allowed them to survive and eventually thrive in the postcommunist period.
What was it that so distinguished Yugoslav from Soviet communism? Events at 
crucial historical junctures—the way communism came to power and the development 
of “self-management”—led to important institutional arrangements, including workers’ 
councils, a decentralized and marketized economy, and shifting alliances among 
workers, managers, and political elites.104 All of this allowed for the development of a 
powerful labor movement, but one where the timing of its mobilization and the content 
of its demands were also crucial. The contrast with Poland, where the workers’ move-
ment also had considerable power resources yet was riven by political divisions and 
a very different interpretation of interests, is revealing. So are comparisons with the 
former Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Serbia, where unionization rates and worker 
militancy remain high.105 Yet unlike in Slovenia, such mobilizations occurred after 
nationalist wars, and well after the basic institutions of postcommunism were forged.
To the extent that it tells us something about the varieties of capitalism, the Slovenian 
case—and its dramatic distinction from every other postcommunist society—suggests 
a considerable unevenness to such varieties. The near-absence of coordination among 
postcommunist cases underscores what others have argued about the rise of coordinated 
institutions elsewhere: in contrast to liberal economies, the development of coordi-
nated market economies appears to be particularly historically contingent and difficult 
to construct.106 Although varieties of capitalism do exist, some varieties are harder to 
create, and arguably harder to maintain, than others.
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Indeed, even with its particular confluence of factors, the survival of Slovenia’s 
distinctive model of postcommunist coordination is not guaranteed. If Slovenia’s cor-
poratism is, in fact, eroding under the pressures of Europeanization and globalization, 
there would seem to be three possible interpretations. First, Slovenia might not be a 
coordinated economy after all; however, this would beg the question of how an econ-
omy can have all the attributes of an ideal type without actually being one. Second, one 
might argue that two decades is not enough time for such institutions to become con-
solidated. Or third, more troubling for the VoC perspective, the theory might overstate 
the resilience of coordinated economies in the face of global economic pressures for 
liberalization, since such pressures can create change that is both gradual and transfor-
mative.107 Time will tell which interpretation proves most lasting.
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